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Abstract 
Restructuring of the electricity industry was expected to improve the operating efficiency of 
electric power generators, leading to lower production costs and retail prices.  Most studies 
conclude that there have been some efficiency gains, but the subject of whether retail prices have 
fallen has been contentious.  The existing literature has a number of shortcomings, including the 
use of blunt or inappropriate definitions of restructuring, failure to incorporate the effects of 
regulatory decisions regarding price caps and stranded cost recovery, and the use of highly 
aggregated data.  Our study addresses many of these problems and thus represents a significant 
improvement on existing work.  We use a detailed firm-level data set to estimate how the 
markets and institutions established as a part of “restructuring” have affected the difference 
between prices and costs.  Based on a number of different definitions, we find that utilities that 
have undergone restructuring display significantly higher price-cost markups than utilities that 
remained traditionally regulated.  We find that some elements of restructuring are associated 
with higher price-cost margins, while others appear to be uncorrelated with prices and costs.  The 
combination of introducing retail competition into an electric utility’s operating territory and 
divestiture of that utility’s generating assets has increased costs, but has increased prices even 
more.  In particular, we find an average difference of 2 to 3 cents per kWh between prices and 
costs that is explained by restructuring rather than by increases in fuel prices.  We conclude that 
restructuring has been beneficial to companies that restructured, but the evidence is far less clear 
concerning benefits to consumers. 
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1. Introduction 
Electricity restructuring in the United States has its roots in the combination of the 1970s energy 
crises and the high costs involved in efforts to decouple the U.S. electric system from the world 
petroleum market.  Poor oversight and management of nuclear power facilities combined with 
generous contract terms for unconventional generators added to the problem of rising consumer 
electricity prices.  Modern restructuring efforts in the U.S. electricity industry began in 1992 
with the first Energy Policy Act, which allowed non-utility generators and marketers to compete 
in the same nascent wholesale markets as traditional vertically-integrated utilities.  The 1996 
issuance of Order 888 by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) was aimed at 
increasing competition by removing barriers to access to the utility-owned transmission grid. 
Beginning in 1998, individual states began restructuring efforts of their own, with California and 
Pennsylvania the first to act.  Despite the mix of federal and state-level policies, electricity 
restructuring in most regions and states has several common features (Blumsack, Apt and Lave 
2005, Joskow 2006): 
1.  Traditional electric utilities were vertically unbundled.  California, for example, required 
its three investor-owned utilities (IOUs) to effectively unbundle by divesting themselves 
of most generation and surrendering control (though not ownership) of transmission 
assets to an Independent System Operator (ISO) or Regional Transmission Organization 
(RTO).1  Utilities in many other states divested themselves of generation assets without 
an explicit requirement that they do so.  Although FERC has promoted surrendering 
control of transmission assets to RTOs through Order 2000 and its proposed Standard 
Market Design (SMD), very few utilities have actually surrendered ownership of 
transmission assets. 
2. The interconnected North American transmission grid is no longer solely operated and 
managed by transmission-owning utilities.  Many areas of the North American grid are 
managed by RTOs.  These RTOs (and vertically-integrated utilities) dispatch generation 
                                                          
1 There are subtle differences between ISOs and RTOs, the most significant of which is that an RTO is a regional 
grid operator with a FERC-approved tariff.  California currently has an ISO that is seeking FERC approval for its 
LMP pricing regime.  Texas has an ISO that operates similarly to FERC-approved RTOs, but FERC currently does 
not exercise jurisdiction over the Texas electric system.  In this paper, we will use RTO as a generic term meant to 
encompass all regional grid operators that also run centralized markets for electric energy. 
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resources within their footprints and are responsible for managing congestion on the grid 
and ensuring that supply and demand are in balance. 
3. Many RTOs also run a series of centralized auction markets for electric energy, capacity, 
transmission rights, and other ancillary services.  The exact auction structure varies 
among RTOs, but common to nearly all are “spot” markets for electric energy, conducted 
one day ahead and one hour ahead of actual delivery and consumption. 
4. A number of states have introduced retail competition for electric generation (as distinct 
from the transmission and distribution services traditionally provided by the regulated 
utility).  Under retail competition, individual consumers are allowed to choose from 
among a number of non-utility generation suppliers.  Those who do not choose one of 
these competitive suppliers are assigned to a “default” supplier and electric rate schedule, 
usually from the incumbent distribution utility. 
5. Utilities have been allowed to recover so-called “stranded costs,” most of which represent 
investments made under regulation that would likely not have been made in a competitive 
environment.  Examples include nuclear and renewable generation investments.  Stranded 
cost recovery has come about largely through surcharges on customer bills. 
 
Initially, restructuring was driven by the dual goals of fixing a regulatory system that was 
perceived to be fundamentally flawed, and reducing prices to consumers.  A secondary goal was 
to reduce the amount of refined petroleum used in U.S. electric generation.  For the first eight 
decades in the history of the electric power industry, prices fell nearly every year as 
technological advances increased generation efficiency, as shown in Figure 1.  The oil crises in 
the 1970s, combined with massive cost over-runs in new large generators (particularly nuclear 
plants), depressed demand and increased costs.  Average rates rose accordingly, and on average 
have continued to rise since then. 
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F igure 1: Residential price of electricity, in current-year cents per kilowatt-hour.  Source: 
Morgan, et al. (2005). 
Later stages of electricity restructuring have been driven by a variety of policy goals, including 
improving operating efficiency at generators, reducing the cross-subsidies present in regulated 
rates, and reducing pollution.  Ultimately, many of the goals of restructuring were focused on 
reducing costs and prices through the introduction of competitive markets for electric generation 
(Joskow and Schmalensee 1983, de Vries 2004).  In issuing its preferred electricity market 
design, FERC stated an explicit policy goal of introducing competition at the retail and 
wholesale level, so that market prices would reflect marginal generation costs (FERC 2003).  
Particularly in light of wholesale price spikes related to the manipulation of markets in California 
in 2000-01, the issue of whether restructuring has benefited consumers has been controversial. 
We examine the behavior of costs and prices for investor-owned electric utilities under 
regulation and restructuring.  We use a detailed firm-level data set to construct average annual 
costs of electric service, and compare the difference between our estimated costs and utility-
reported electric rates over time, for three different classes of customers.  Our data set allows us 
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to decompose “restructuring” into three separate policies: joining an RTO, divestiture of 
generation assets, and the introduction of retail competition.  The way that we construct our cost 
estimates also allows us to incorporate the effects of rising fuel prices.  Given the existing 
evidence that restructuring has yielded efficiency gains in production, the economic issue 
becomes how those efficiency gains have been shared between producers and consumers.  
Existing policy goals reflect an economic hypothesis that competition should decrease the 
difference between prices and costs following restructuring, after accounting for fuel price 
changes.  Our analysis of the data does not support this hypothesis.  Overall, the various policy 
choices involved in electric restructuring since the mid 1990s are associated with larger markups 
of rates over costs for those utilities that have undergone restructuring, indicating that most of the 
gains associated with restructuring have, thus far, been enjoyed by producers.  Our results are 
consistent with some of the existing literature (particularly Apt 2005 and Tabor, Chapman and 
Mount 2007, discussed below) suggesting that consumers have not enjoyed large benefits from 
restructuring in the form of lower prices.  Of the policies we are able to analyze, divestiture and 
the introduction of retail competition are consistently associated with higher price-cost markups, 
while simply being within the footprint of an RTO does not appear to have a significant effect. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews the existing evidence on 
whether electricity restructuring has produced efficiency gains in production, and whether 
consumers have seen lower electric rates as a result.  Section 3 introduces the data and 
econometric model used in this analysis.  A discussion of the results is in Section 4, and Section 
5 offers some concluding thoughts. 
 
2. E lectric Restructuring, Production E fficiency, and Retail Prices 
Many capital-intensive network industries have successfully been deregulated in one form or 
another.  Natural gas and airline deregulation commenced in 1978, followed by trucking and 
railroads in 1980.  Deregulation in natural gas is generally viewed as having increased industry 
efficiency and benefited consumers (de Vany and Walls 1993).  Deregulation in transport and 
shipping industries has also generally been considered successful (Crandall and Ellig 1997, 
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1998).  In particular, Crandall and Ellig (1998) note that prices in these industries dropped 
dramatically (25% or more) within 10 years following the inception of deregulation. 
Smaller (but still significant) efficiency gains of 3% to 13% were expected as a result of 
restructuring in electricity (Christensen and Greene 1976, Klitgaard and Reddy 2000, Kleit and 
Terrell 2001).  In electric generation, capital costs represent a large proportion of total costs, so 
efficiency gains in production of electricity in the short-term were expected to stem largely from 
using low-cost generation assets more intensively.  Increased labor productivity was expected, 
but since labor makes up only 7% of the total cost of electricity (Apt 2005), the contribution of 
labor to overall cost reductions was likely to be small.  In the long-run, old and inefficient plants 
were expected to be replaced. 
Overall, restructuring (or the anticipation of competition) appears to have produced efficiency 
gains in several areas of the electric generation sector.  Niederjohn (2003) reports that 
employment in electricity generation dropped by 29% in states that underwent restructuring, 
compared to a 19% overall decrease in the sector's employment.  As a group, generators in states 
that have retained the traditional regulatory structure have seen smaller efficiency gains than 
generators in restructured states (Wolfram 2005; Fabrizio, Rose and Wolfram 2007).  The 
biggest gains have come in the increased utilization rates of low-cost generation sources.2  
Douglas (2006) estimates that the introduction of centralized regional electricity markets has 
increased the utilization of low-cost coal-fired power plants, relative to high-cost coal plants, 
with cost savings between 2% and 3%.  Meanwhile, high fuel prices have caused the utilization 
rates of gas-fired generators to plummet starting in 2000 (Blumsack, Apt and Lave 2005).3  The 
most striking improvement has come from the U.S. nuclear sector, which has increased average 
utilization (or availability) rates from less than 60% in the 1970s to over 90% in 2006.  Blumsack 
and Lave (2004) and Zhang (2006) present evidence tying these efficiency gains to electricity 
restructuring, while a different conclusion is reached by Spinner (2006) and the American Public 
Power Association (2007). 
                                                          
2 Primarily coal and nuclear generation, these low-cost resources represent the “base load” generating assets that 
operate for days or months at a time. 
3 Between 1999 and 2002, the U.S. electric sector added nearly 50 gigawatts (GW) of new gas-fired generation, and 
around 10 GW of new generation from all other fuel sources combined.  During that same period, consumption of 
natural gas for electricity increased by 50% and wholesale prices for natural gas tripled.  Utilization of this new gas 
capacity was low, since the generators were effectively priced out of the market. 
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Overall, the evidence on production efficiency suggests that measurable gains have been made 
since electric industry restructuring, though the distribution of gains among various facets of the 
generation sector has varied widely.  We may thus conclude that, in general, restructuring has 
lowered the cost of producing electric power in those areas where restructuring has occurred.  As 
to whether these cost savings have flowed down to consumers in the form of lower prices, the 
evidence is far less clear. 
To date, more than a dozen studies have been produced examining the effects of restructuring on 
electricity prices (Kwoka 2006, Lave, Apt and Blumsack 2007a,b).   The studies vary widely 
regarding scope, method, and conclusions.  Two types of comparisons are generally used 
throughout this literature.  The first is a time-series comparison of electricity prices within some 
region (wholesale or retail) prior to restructuring with the same set of prices following the 
introduction of restructuring and competitive generation markets.  The second is a cross-
sectional comparison of electricity prices in areas that have undergone restructuring with those 
that have retained the traditional model of regulated electric utilities.  Some studies combine 
cross-section and time-series data to perform a panel analysis of electricity prices.  With respect 
to the time dimension of electricity prices (that is, the aspect of some studies comparing prices 
before and after restructuring), some studies simply compare prices between the two periods, 
while others attempt to construct a counterfactual argument – an estimate of what electricity 
prices would have been, had traditional regulation not been replaced with new markets and 
regulatory institutions.  A third comparison method (Apt 2005, used also in Douglas 2006), uses 
a “differences in differences” approach, focusing on the rate of change in electricity prices under 
regulation and restructuring rather than the price level itself. 
One group of studies focuses on wholesale electric prices or generation costs, without explicitly 
examining retail prices.  These studies are more in the spirit of the production-efficiency studies 
discussed above (such as Wolfram 2005, Douglas 2006, and Zhang 2006) than with studies of 
retail prices.  Synapse Energy Economics (Synapse, 2004) uses financial and operating data for 
three generating companies in the PJM region to construct production cost estimates for each of 
the three companies before and after restructuring.  The Synapse study generally finds small, but 
significant, differences in generating costs.  Energy Security Analysis, Inc. (ESAI, 2005) uses a 
power-flow model of the PJM region to examine the effects of the expansion of the PJM territory 
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on wholesale electricity prices.  They conclude that since the PJM expansion brought a large 
amount of low-cost generation into the PJM operating area, prices in the highest-cost areas of 
PJM (largely along the eastern seaboard) have declined.   
A second (and larger) group of studies, more relevant to this paper, examines the effect of 
restructuring on retail electricity prices.  The Center for the Advancement of Energy Markets 
(CAEM, 2003) focuses on the portion of the power grid within the PJM footprint.  The CAEM 
study performs some simple quantitative comparisons of retail prices before and after 
restructuring, and between PJM states and regulated states adjacent to the PJM territory.4  The 
study concludes that restructuring in the first five years of the PJM region has saved consumers 
billions of dollars, with tens of billions of (real) dollars in forecasted future savings.  Global 
Energy Decisions (GED, 2005) focuses not on one particular RTO, but on the entire Eastern 
Interconnect.5  The GED study constructs a counterfactual by simulating what generation costs 
would have been in the absence of restructuring.  These simulated costs and prices are compared 
to actual average electric rates during the regulated period.  GED concludes that the introduction 
of regional electricity markets reduced power purchase costs for utilities by approximately $15 
billion, which are assumed to be passed on directly to consumers.  Apt (2005) uses a differences-
in-differences approach (though without any explicit econometrics) to examine the behavior of 
the rate of change of industrial electricity prices in regulated and deregulated states.  Broadly, 
Apt finds no correlation between the introduction of restructuring and differences in the rate of 
change of industrial electricity prices.  A more recent piece by Lesser (2007), focusing solely on 
Pennsylvania, provides a number of arguments and pieces of anecdotal evidence (but no 
systematic quantitative analysis) suggesting that restructuring has benefited electricity consumers 
in Pennsylvania. 
Other studies of retail electricity prices use a variety of econometric techniques to examine the 
relationship between electricity restructuring and changes in the behavior of prices faced by 
                                                          
4 The CAEM study does not perform a panel data analysis.  Rather, it performs one set of analysis for prices within 
PJM over time, and a different analysis comparing prices within the PJM territory to those in regulated states outside 
of PJM. 
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consumers.  These studies allow the effects of changes in variables such as fuel prices, the 
composition of the generation fleet, and industry structure to be decomposed explicitly.  A study 
by Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA, 2005) regresses inflation-adjusted retail 
electric rates from 1978 until 1997 (defined by CERA as the starting point of modern 
restructuring) on a fuel price variable and a cost-of-capital variable, and then uses that 
relationship to simulate prices from 1998 through 2003.  Comparing these simulated prices with 
actual prices, the CERA report yields similar savings as CAEM (2003); that savings to 
consumers have been in the tens of billions of dollars.  Fagan (2006) estimates three different 
models relating electricity prices (or price changes) to: fuel prices; the status of state-level 
restructuring; and RTO membership.  Fagan finds no statistically significant evidence that 
restructuring, however measured, is related to lower electricity prices.  Focusing explicitly on the 
introduction of retail competition in Texas, Zarkinau and Whitworth (2006) and Zarkinau, Fox 
and Smolen (2007) find evidence that retail prices for residential and commercial customers have 
actually increased in areas of Texas where retail competition has been introduced. 
Perhaps the two most thorough analyses of retail prices to date have been those of Joskow (2006) 
and Taber, Chapman and Mount (2006).  Joskow’s analysis covers average retail prices for 
residential and industrial customer classes in U.S. states for the period 1970 to 2003.  In addition 
to accounting for inflation, fuel prices and the mix of generation resources, Joskow adds the 
share of generation from PURPA and non-utility generators (also called independent power 
producers or IPPs), and a measure of the financial attractiveness of utilities.  Joskow finds that 
the coefficients on PURPA generation are positive, relatively large in magnitude, and statistically 
significant, indicating that (aside from cost variables such as fuel prices) PURPA requirements 
beginning in the late 1970s have increased prices in certain states for more than two decades.  
More relevant to modern restructuring, Joskow finds that larger amounts of power coming from 
independent generating companies and the introduction of retail competition are both associated 
with lower retail electricity prices.  Overall, Joskow finds that modern restructuring policies have 
resulted in retail rate decreases of approximately 5% to 10%. 
Taber, Chapman and Mount (TCM, 2006) estimate a generalized autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model (Bollerslev 1986) of electricity prices in U.S. states covering 
the period 1990 to 2004.  TCM examine average retail prices in four different rate classes 
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(residential, commercial, industrial, and an average over all rate classes), and perform separate 
analyses for private and public utilities, as well as a number of different definitions of 
“restructuring.”  TCM perform their analysis at the utility level rather than at the state level.6  
Their dependent variable of interest is the “price gap” – the difference in prices between utilities 
that have undergone restructuring and those that have maintained the traditional regulatory and 
organizational structure.  As with other detailed studies of electricity prices, the TCM study 
includes variables to capture the effects of changes in fuel prices, as well as inter-utility variation 
in the mix of generating assets.  TCM find no evidence that restructuring, however defined, has 
caused retail electricity prices to decline, relative to utilities that have remained regulated.  This 
main result is robust to many different model specifications. 
The existing literature on the relationship between electricity restructuring and retail prices is 
sufficiently heterogeneous that it is difficult to draw broad conclusions, other than there exists 
little agreement on whether restructuring has accomplished the policy goal of controlling prices 
as well as costs.  As Kwoka (2006) and Blumsack (2007) point out, perhaps the broadest 
conclusion that can be drawn is that the studies from industry and consultants have generally 
found large price savings (or other consumer benefits) from restructuring, whereas studies from 
academic researchers have found no evidence linking electricity restructuring with lower retail 
electric rates.7 
Drawing policy conclusions based on the existing literature is made more difficult by the wide 
variance in the methods employed in each of the studies, as well as the overall quality of the 
studies.  Kwoka (2006) provides a careful and thorough review of a dozen studies attempting to 
link electricity restructuring with retail prices.  Kwoka finds significant methodological flaws 
with every single study, and concludes that none of them can be considered exemplars of good 
econometric work.  Thus, he concludes that none of the results from the existing body of 
research can be trusted with a high degree of confidence. 
Kwoka (2006) discusses three broad problems with the methods used in existing studies of 
electricity restructuring and consumer benefits.  The first problem is in the basic definition of 
                                                          
6 The data set used by TCM is EIA Form 861, which is quite detailed but contains a number of omissions and 
instances of missing data.  TCM address the missing-data problem by substituting available data that, a priori, is 
believed to be highly correlated with the missing data.  See Appendix A of TCM. 
7 Joskow’s (2006) careful study represents a significant deviation from this trend. 
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restructuring.  Nearly all the studies reviewed here and in Kwoka (2006) use one or more dummy 
variables to demarcate a point in the data series where regulation ended and restructuring began.  
This use of dummy variables ignores the fact that “electricity restructuring was not a single event 
that occurred at one point in time.”8  Within a single state, for example, different utilities chose 
to join RTOs during different years, or at different times within the same year.  In a state-level 
study, deciding on a single month or year when a particular state transitioned from “regulated” to 
“restructured” may be arbitrary at some level. 
The second problem discussed by Kwoka is that the available retail price data may not reflect all 
of the relevant regulatory and institutional changes involved in restructuring.  During the 
transition to retail competition, many states imposed caps, freezes, or both on the rates that the 
incumbent utility could charge to “default” customers (those who did not sign up with a third-
party competitive supplier).  In some cases, these rate caps/freezes were in place for nearly ten 
years, during which time natural gas prices tripled.  Many of the data sets used in the existing 
literature cover the period where the rate caps were imposed, but not when the rate caps were 
lifted.  The retail price data may reflect these rate caps, but most studies have not modeled or 
otherwise adjusted for these regulatory actions.  In addition, as a part of restructuring legislation, 
many utilities were allowed to recover “stranded costs,” largely through surcharges on customer 
bills.  These stranded cost charges thus drive a wedge between the equilibrium price (which may 
be modeled as part of an economic study) and the actual price.  Finally, the boom in gas-fired 
generator construction during the early 2000s far outpaced increases in demand.  The industry 
was thus left with a significant amount of excess capacity. 
The third issue is the age-old problem of causality.  Kwoka criticizes many of the existing 
studies for drawing causal links between restructuring and electricity prices while failing to 
account for other covariates which may (or may not) explain more of the variance in electricity 
prices.  In particular, Kwoka criticizes the use of the following model to create a counterfactual 
set of electricity prices.  Let t1,…,tR-1 represent the series of time periods up until period R-1, 
when restructuring takes place.9 Data on electricity prices pti and a set of explanatory variables 
X ti are gathered, and a model of the form pti = f(X ; β) is estimated, for i = 1,…,R-1.  The 
                                                          
8 Kwoka (2006), Section II.B. 
9 As Kwoka points out, assuming the existence of a single point in time dividing the pre- and post-restructuring 
periods is, in many cases, an oversimplification.  We adopt the breakpoint assumption here for simplicity. 
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parameter estimate  is then used to produce price estimates of pti, , for the period R 
defining the beginning of restructuring, to period T, representing some end date.  These 
counterfactual price estimates  are then compared to the actual prevailing prices 
during the same time period.  While this would seem a natural method for determining how 
electricity prices have behaved under restructuring compared to a world where traditional 
regulation had simply continued, Kwoka suggests that this method may exclude valuable 
information from the restructuring sample period.10  
In this paper, we have gathered a detailed firm-level data set that will allow us to address many 
of Kwoka’s specific critiques.  We now turn to a discussion of the data used in this study. 
3. Data and Modeling 
The existing evidence suggests that restructuring has improved production efficiency, but 
whether (or how much of) these efficiency gains have been passed on to consumers is much less 
clear.  Subject to various regulatory lags, rate of return regulation should have promoted a 
reasonably stable relationship between prices and costs.  When costs increased (as when utilities 
made investments for reliability or resource adequacy), regulators would allow pass-throughs to 
customers.  Traditional methods of price regulation such as price cap regulation (RPI-X) 
attempted to give utilities incentives to lower costs and prices through production efficiencies 
(Kahn 1988). 
Under restructuring, generators have generally been free to charge market-based rates, either in 
bilateral markets or centralized auctions run by RTOs.  Cost and performance risk have been at 
least partially shifted to shareholders in generating companies, rather than customers of 
distribution utilities.  By themselves, none of these factors necessarily imply that costs or prices 
should move one way or another.  Increased wealth through higher productivity and operating 
efficiency should be shared between customers and generators.  Higher costs (rising fuel prices, 
for example) will cause prices to rise.   
                                                          
10 One particularly relevant example involves the behavior of natural gas prices and investment in natural gas 
generating units in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  The counterfactual method of estimating what prices would have 
done had regulation simply continued implicitly assumes that the generation mix would remain roughly the same 
beginning in the late 1990s as it had been in previous decades.  In particular, the boom in gas-fired generation would 
never have occurred.  Another example of information that would be left out using the counterfactual method is the 
wide variety of state-level standards for renewable or alternative electricity generation sources. 
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Blumsack, Apt and Lave (2005) discuss several reasons why, a priori, the form of restructuring 
undertaken in the U.S. would increase the gap between generating costs and prices faced by 
consumers.  The auction structure used in RTO markets pays generators based on the bid or cost 
of the marginal unit, whereas under regulation, each generator was effectively paid its average 
cost.  This results in some transfer of wealth from consumers to generators, as low-cost 
generators are allowed to earn rents (competitive or otherwise).  In addition, the total short-run 
system cost of serving a given amount of load is likely to rise.  Another significant factor that 
may increase cost in the long run is the risk premium placed on non-utility generation and 
transmission investment.  The costs of administering RTO markets are another factor, but on an 
average basis these have generally been small relative to total costs, and for the most part are 
declining on a per-unit basis. 
We are left with two different price and cost effects of restructuring.  If the rise in fuel prices has 
outweighed the efficiency gains, these increased net costs should be reflected in prices.  On the 
other hand, the auction structure suggests a divergence between costs (particularly those of base 
load generators) and prices.  Either way, the relevant variable is not the price of electricity, but 
the difference between prices and costs.  This analysis thus focuses on the price-cost markup of 
electricity. 
We collected price data covering the period 1990 through 2005 from Average Rates and Typical 
Bills, a semi-annual publication from the Edison Electric Institute (EEI).  EEI collects electric 
rate data for a large number of investor-owned utilities.  Due to high frequencies of non-
reporting for some utilities, we excluded some companies from our data set.  This issue will be 
discussed more below, but our final data set includes 71 utilities from 37 different states.   49% 
of the utilities in our sample underwent some form of restructuring.  A list of the companies in 
our data set can be found in Appendix A.  A highly detailed description of this data set can be 
found in Appendix B.   
The data in the Average Rates and Typical Bills publication is broken up by utility and also by 
rate class.  In this paper we confine our attention to residential, commercial, and industrial rate 
classes (as well as an overall average rate for each utility).   The “average rates” portion of the 
publication reports twelve-month trailing average electricity prices.  Thus, the average rates 
published in the summer of year t represent an average of the last six months of year t-1 and the 
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first six months of year t.  Average rates published in the winter of year t represent an annual 
average from year t-1.  The “typical bills” portion of the publication reports single-period 
observations of total electric bills by utility and rate class.  Thus, the “typical bill” data represents 
a series of snapshots, while the “average rate” data represents a moving average.  In order to 
maintain consistency with the FERC Form 1 data on which we base our cost estimates (see 
below and also Appendix C), our price series consists of annual observations for each utility and 
rate class.  The variables we construct from the Average Rates and Typical Bills publications are: 
Rateijt = Average electric rate, in cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh) for customer class i from utility j 
in year t.  The customer classes we consider are i = {all classes, commercial, residential, 
industrial}.  Electric rates are adjusted for inflation using the consumer price index. 
Fuel Costijt = Fuel cost adjustment, in cents per kWh, allowed to customer class i for utility j in 
year t by the relevant public utility commission.  Not every utility is allowed a fuel cost 
adjustment in every year. 
CTCjt  = Competitive Transition Charge allowed to utility j in year t.  The CTC represents the 
utility’s stranded cost recovery allowance.  The CTC is only applicable to those utilities that have 
undergone restructuring. 
Net Rateijt = Rateijt – CTCjt, for all applicable i, j, and t. 
We collect data on utility-level costs from historical FERC Form 1 filings, covering the period 
1994 through 2005.  Each investor-owned utility is required to make a Form 1 filing with FERC 
each year.  In more recent years (following the California power crisis and the 
Midwest/Northeast blackout of 2003), FERC has required utilities to fill out Form 1 on a 
quarterly basis.  Since this is a recent reporting requirement, and since we found utilities to be 
inconsistent in filling out quarterly Form 1 reports, we use only the year-end Form 1 reports, 
which contain annual financial and system performance data.  More detail on which data we 
extracted from the FERC Form 1 can be found in Appendix C. 
Based on the data in the Form 1 reports, we construct total and average operating cost curves for 
each utility.  The equation we use for the total cost of utility j in year t is: 
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Total Costi,t ($) = Reported Generation Cost i,t + Reported Transmission Expendituresi,t + 
Reported Distribution Expendituresi,t + Value of Reported Power Purchasesi,t - Value of 
Reported Sales for Resalei,t. 
We highlight several points regarding the total cost equation.  First, the effects of higher fuel 
prices on electricity production costs are reflected in both the generation cost variable (which 
reflects the cost of a utility producing power from its own plants) and the power purchase 
variable (which reflects the cost of power that utilities choose to or must buy from the market).  
We do not use separate variables for fuel prices, as other studies have done (such as Joskow 2006 
and Taber, Chapman and Mount 2006).  We did construct these variables and did test an 
alternate regression specification including these variables.  We found that many of the fuel-mix 
variables were statistically insignificant and had coefficients that were hard to interpret.  The 
regression results are included in Appendix D.  In one respect, our cost variables are superior to 
using published fuel prices, since we are able to capture inter-utility (not just inter-regional) 
variations in fuel costs.  Finally, the “sales for resale” variable reflects revenues earned by the 
utility when it sells electricity on the open market.  
We then use total reported sales to end-use consumers (in all rate classes) to construct an average 
cost figure for each utility j in year t, as follows:11 
Average Costi,t (¢/kWh) = Total Cost i,t ÷ Total Reported Sales to End-Use Consumersi,t. 
Our cost variables are adjusted for inflation using the producer price index for utilities.  We can 
now formally define our price-cost markup variable as: 
Markupijt = Net Rateijt - Average Costi,t. 
We tested an alternate definition of the price-cost markup representing the percentage difference 
of price over cost, but found that the regressions had more explanatory power when the markup 
was defined as the level of price over cost.  Regression results from the alternate specification 
are included in Appendix D.   
                                                          
11 Because of the nature of AC power flow, and the lack of sufficiently detailed data, it is practically impossible to 
construct average cost curves for each customer rate class.  Such a data set would be quite valuable, but would 
require detailed load profile and contract information for each customer, as well as a way to trace specific electrons 
from the power plant to the specific customer on the distribution network. 
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We also collected data on annual generation mixes, and total annual generation for each utility, 
from EIA Form 861.  Using the generation mix variables as explanatory variables seemed 
redundant, given how we constructed our generation cost variable from FERC Form 1 data.  We 
did test a model specification including the generation mix variables as regressors; the output 
from these models is included in Appendix D.  We do use the generation data to construct a 
measure of self-generation versus exposure to the hourly or bilateral electricity markets: 
SelfGenjt = Purchased Power (MWh)jt ÷ Generation (MWh)jt . 
Kwoka (2006) criticizes existing studies of restructuring for taking too coarse a view regarding 
what constitutes “deregulation.”  While the limitations of our data set prevent us from 
representing restructuring with anything except dummy variables, we do decompose the effects 
of restructuring into three separate variables: 
RTOjt = A dummy variable equal to one for those years in which the jth utility was a member of 
a FERC-approved RTO.12 
Retailijt = A dummy variable equal to one for those years in which the ith customer class of the 
jth utility was able to choose between the traditional utility and a third-party competitive supplier 
for the purchase of generation services. 
Divestjt = A dummy variable equal to one during the year(s) in which utility j divested itself of 
generation assets, whether by voluntary action or regulatory mandate.  The variable is equal to 
one in all years beyond the actual date of divestiture. 
We also collected data on the date of expiry of retail price caps/freezes.  However, expiration of 
the price caps generally occurred (or will occur) beyond the end date of our sample.  Thus, the 
price cap variables we constructed were always insignificant in our regressions. 
The EEI data sets and the FERC Form 1 data sets are not without problems.  First, as mentioned 
above, many utilities respond inconsistently or sporadically to the EEI Average Rates and 
Typical Bills survey.  Most utility data series are missing at least some observations.  Of the 149 
U.S. utilities included in the EEI publication from 1994 to 2005,13 we obtained 34 complete price 
                                                          
12 We do not have any utilities from Texas in our sample.  We include the California ISO as a FERC-approved RTO. 
13 We excluded utilities from Alaska and Hawaii, as well as utilities from outside the U.S. 
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data sets.  The average percentage of missing observations was 21.44%, while the median 
percentage of missing observations was 9.09%.  Four companies had a non-response rate of 96% 
(the maximum non-response rate we observed).  
Based on the efficiency test in Griliches (1986), we determined a cutoff of 30% missing 
observations, before we observed a significant difference in the standard error of our regressions.  
We handled the missing observations in two different ways.  First, we simply recorded missing 
observations as zeros and otherwise left the data set untouched.  Second, we smoothed the gaps 
in the missing data using the following moving average process: 
 
where Rateijt* represents a missing observation for year t.  The choice of K* had little effect on 
the outcome of the regressions, so we used K*=2. 
In our regressions, we found that the results were not sensitive to whether we used a smoothing 
process to fill in the missing data or recorded missing observations as zeros.  The results 
presented here are those for which the data set was unaltered, and missing observations were left 
as zeros. 
We tested the EEI data sets for multiple orders of autocorrelation.  Table 1 shows the Ljung-Box 
Q statistics for the first several orders of autocorrelation.  We find evidence of first-order 
autocorrelation in the time series of electric rates in each customer class.  This is confirmed by a 
simple Breusch-Godfrey test statistic of 10.5, compared to a   critical value of 3.8 (for 
PQ0.95). 
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Table 1: Ljung-Box Q Statistics for price-cost markups by customer class.  Entries in bold italics 
signify that the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation at the specified order can be rejected at the 
5% significance level. 
Care must also be taken when interpreting or using the FERC Form 1 data.  While the data set is 
highly detailed (and thus, for better or for worse, is the best data source of its kind for U.S. 
utilities), not all companies use the same accounting standards in their Form 1 filings.  Further, 
the accounting standards may change from year to year for a given utility.  In particular, utilities 
can differ amongst each other, and over time, regarding what costs are allocated to operations 
and maintenance (O&M) expenditures, and what costs are considered capital expenditures (and 
therefore can go into the rate base).14   
The definition of costs used in this paper includes reported operating and maintenance costs but 
not capital investment costs.  It is possible that some utilities in some years re-allocated costs 
from O&M to capital in order to increase their rate-base revenues in years of high market prices 
or uncertainty.  This will, in general, reduce the explanatory power of our regression models by 
increasing the error term.  Assuming that the variation in cost allocation among utilities over 
time is a mean-zero normal random variable, our regression model will take the general form: 
 
 
where u and T are both the standard white-noise error terms (Greene 2002). 
Assuming that all of the variables in X  are known with certainty, then our model becomes an 
errors-in-variables model, but only in the dependent variable.  Since , we then get a 
regression equation of the form: 
 
This equation can be estimated using standard techniques. 
 
                                                          
14 Personal communication (via e-mail) with Bruce Edelston, November 12, 2007. 
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4. Results 
In general, we found a persistent gap between the price-cost markups for regulated and 
restructured utilities, as shown in Figure 2.  The figure is somewhat simplistic in that it defines a 
restructured utility as one that underwent at least one form of restructuring (wholesale 
competition, retail competition, or divestiture) between 1994 and 2005.  Figure 2 in and of itself 
does not say very much about the effect of restructuring; rather it suggests some fundamental 
differences in utilities that restructured versus those that did not.  However, the difference 
between the markups for restructured utilities and regulated utilities has increased over time, 
particularly beginning in 1998 (when California and Pennsylvania became the first states to 
embrace modern restructuring).  The difference in markups between restructured and regulated 
utilities also became more pronounced beginning in 2001.  This difference is shown graphically 
in Figure 3. 
Markups for Deregulated and Regulated Utilities, All Customer Classes
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F igure 2. Price-cost markups for all customer classes. In this figure, utilities are judged to be 
“deregulated” if at any point in our sample the utility was subject to asset divestiture, retail 
competition, or was located within an RTO footprint. 
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F igure 3. The difference in price-cost markups for deregulated vs. regulated utilities, all 
customer classes.  In this figure, utilities are judged to be “deregulated” if at any point in our 
sample the utility was subject to asset divestiture, retail competition, or was located within an 
RTO footprint. 
Since the differences in markups are not constant over time, we investigate utility-specific, 
market, and regulatory factors that could explain why the price-cost markups have increased 
much more for restructured utilities than for utilities that remained traditionally regulated.  We 
estimate the following regression equation, for all customer classes i = {all classes together, 
residential, commercial, and industrial}, all utilities j, and all years t between 1994 and 2005. 
Markupijt = i0 + i1(Year) + i2(RTO Dummyijt) + i3(Retail Competition Dummyijt) + 
i4(Divestiture Dummyijt) + i5(RTORetailijt) +i6(RTO  Divestitureijt) + i7(Ratio of 
Purchases to Generationijt) + i8(Fuel Cost Adjustmentijt) + ijt  
We included the interaction terms RTO  Retailijt and RTO  Divestitureijt to capture the effects 
of utilities that undertook two of the components of restructuring, but perhaps not a third (in our 
sample, there were no utilities that embraced retail competition and divested, but did not join an 
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RTO).  We estimate separate models for each rate class, using Feasible Generalized Least 
Squares (Greene 2002), correcting for heteroscedasticity and first-order autocorrelation. 
Tables 2 through 5 show the estimated parameters for each of the four models we estimated. 
Dependent variable : Ave rage  Mark up (Leve l)
Variable Coe ff icient T-Statist ic
Constant 3.40 21.86
Time -0.39 -11.86
RTO Dummy 0.29 0.41
Retail Dummy 2.51 2.97
Divestiture Dummy 1.07 4.46
RTO*Retail -2.43 -2.28
RTO*Divestiture 0.47 0.63
Ratio of Purchases to Generation 9*10^-4 -6.15
Fuel Cost Adjustment 0.02 0.25
Regression Std. Error 7.09
Regression Adjusted R^2 0.42  
Table 2: Results for all rate classes together.  Parameter estimates in bold italics are statistically 
significant at the 5% level. 
 
Dependent variable : Residential Mark up (Leve l)
Variable Coe ff icient T-Statist ic
Constant 4.76 24.96
Time -0.38 -10.33
RTO Dummy 0.93 1.42
Retail Dummy 2.70 3.23
Divestiture Dummy 1.53 5.36
RTO*Retail -2.75 -2.67
RTO*Divestiture -0.24 -0.31
Ratio of Purchases to Generation 5*10^-4 -3.13
Fuel Cost Adjustment 0.02 0.19
Regression Std. Error 8.32
Regression Adjusted R^2 0.39  
Table 3: Results for the residential rate class.  Parameter estimates in bold italics are 
statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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Dependent variable : Comme rcial Mark up (Leve l)
Variable Coe ff icient T-Statist ic
Constant 2.34 14.77
Time -0.08 -2.33
RTO Dummy 1.22 1.57
Retail Dummy 1.68 1.95
Divestiture Dummy 1.25 5.16
RTO*Retail -2.15 -1.88
RTO*Divestiture 0.10 0.12
Ratio of Purchases to Generation 8*10^-4 -4.72
Fuel Cost Adjustment 0.10 1.24
Regression Std. Error 8.32
Regression Adjusted R^2 0.39  
Table 4: Results for the commercial rate class.  Parameter estimates in bold italics are 
statistically significant at the 5% level. 
 
Dependent variable : Indust rial Mark up (Leve l)
Variable Coe ff icient T-Statist ic
Constant 3.52 17.90
Time -0.01 -0.23
RTO Dummy 2.13 2.59
Retail Dummy 1.79 2.03
Divestiture Dummy 1.73 5.78
RTO*Retail -2.50 -2.18
RTO*Divestiture -0.78 -0.80
Ratio of Purchases to Generation 0.00 -1.53
Fuel Cost Adjustment 0.11 1.07
Regression Std. Error 8.99
Regression Adjusted R^2 0.35  
Table 5: Results for the industrial rate class.  Parameter estimates in bold italics are statistically 
significant at the 5% level. 
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The regression results in Tables 2 through 5 demonstrate a more complex relationship between 
electricity prices and restructuring than in previous studies.  First, and perhaps most interestingly, 
the various customer classes each appear to have been affected differently by restructuring.  
Overall, those utilities that divested themselves of generation and had their service territory 
opened up to retail competition saw their prices rise, but RTOs themselves appear to have had 
little impact (Table 2).  Note also in Table 2 that the interaction variable for RTO membership 
and retail competition is negative, indicating that retail competition in and of itself is associated 
with higher price-cost markups, while the combination of RTO membership and retail 
competition is associated with lower price-cost markups (though the combined effect is smaller 
than the effect of retail competition alone).  This would seem to suggest some colinearity among 
the RTO and retail competition dummy variables.  We performed a sensitivity analysis where we 
removed the interaction variable.  A chi-squared test on the regression standard error with and 
without the interaction variable suggests that removing this variable would introduce some 
omitted variables bias. 
For both residential and industrial customers, the variables for retail competition and divestiture 
are positive and statistically insignificant.  The RTO dummy variable is positive and statistically 
significant for industrial customers, but not for residential customers.  Industrial customers were 
thought to be the biggest potential beneficiaries of restructuring, so these customers, on average, 
transitioned away from regulated electric rates faster than the other two classes.  Some were able 
to sign advantageous contracts prior to the beginning of restructuring, but which expired 
coincidentally with the rise in natural gas prices (Apt 2005).  Overall, the restructuring variables 
have the least explanatory power (in the sense that most are statistically insignificant at the 5% 
level) for the commercial rate class.  Part of this may be due to the heterogeneity inherent in the 
commercial rate class.  This class of customer includes very small businesses (which may 
consume less electricity than some homes) and large office buildings.15 
The fuel cost adjustment variable has a parameter estimate that is small in magnitude and 
statistically insignificant for all four rate classes.  The ratio of purchases to generation is 
statistically significant in all but the regression for the industrial rate class.  However, the 
                                                          
15 Earlier data in the EEI publications would allow us to separate small and large commercial users.  More recent 
data, however, groups all commercial users into a single category. 
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magnitude of the estimated parameter is quite small.  We thus conclude that these two variables 
have, at best, a marginal impact on price-cost markups for electric utilities. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The question of whether electricity restructuring has lowered prices for consumers has been 
highly contentious.  But the question is an important one – if consumers have not seen lower 
prices, then how are consumers well-served by moving forward (however slowly or erratically) 
with further restructuring efforts?  If the point of restructuring was not to lower costs and prices, 
then what metrics should policymakers use to evaluate whether the restructuring is working as 
intended? 
Existing studies of electricity restructuring and electricity prices offer no clear answer.  By and 
large, studies by consultants and industry groups have been favorable towards restructuring, 
while studies by academics have been more pessimistic.  Further, given the excellent critiques in 
Kwoka (2006), it is not clear whether or how much any of the existing results should be trusted.  
This paper takes a somewhat different approach than in previous work.  We examine how price-
cost markups have changed with restructuring, rather than looking at prices themselves (or 
changes in prices).  The logic is simple: there is solid evidence that restructuring has contributed 
to an increase in productivity and efficiency in electric power generators.  The body of evidence 
on whether these productivity gains have been passed on to consumers is less solid, but overall 
does not suggest that consumers have experienced windfall gains. 
Rather than examining consumer prices per se, we examine differences between reported 
average prices and average costs for investor-owned utilities that have undergone restructuring 
and those that have remained traditionally regulated.  Using a detailed utility-level data set to 
measure prices and costs for different rate classes, we find evidence that price-cost margins are 
significantly higher in regions of the U.S. that have adopted some form of restructuring.  Our 
regression models estimate that, on average, the introduction of retail competition has increased 
price-cost markups by approximately 2.5 cents per kWh.  Utility divestiture has increased price-
cost markups by slightly more than 1 cent per kWh.  Overall, simply joining an RTO has had 
little effect on price-cost markups, although the combination of RTO membership and retail 
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competition appears to dampen the increase in price-cost margins.  Our finding that price-cost 
markups have gone up with restructuring suggests that most of the gains from restructuring have, 
thus far, gone to producers rather than consumers.  This may be true for a number of reasons.  
Rate caps and freezes in many restructured states have introduced market distortions on the retail 
side.  The reallocation of risks and rewards suggests that firms in the electricity market will 
demand higher profits in return for shouldering more of the risk of bad investments or 
management practices.  
A natural question at this point is: if generators are earning higher revenues in the RTO auction 
markets, and if they have lowered their costs by becoming more efficient, where is the money 
going?  One explanation is provided by Bodmer (2006), who demonstrates that share prices of 
low-cost generators operating in restructured markets have increased dramatically since the late 
1990s.  Another explanation may be that generating firms are demanding higher returns in 
exchange for being forced to take on more risk.  Given that our data set consists of distribution 
utilities that are still regulated in some fashion, it is perhaps difficult to square the risk 
explanation with our particular sample.  A third possibility is that firms are able to exercise 
market power in ways that the RTO market monitors do not detect. 
We have improved on previous work, and addressed some of the critiques in Kwoka (2006) by 
using a firm-level data set, and explicitly accounting for firm-specific fuel price increases, fuel 
cost adjustments, and stranded cost recovery.  We also are able to decompose “restructuring” 
into three more specific variables.  But our study still has some important limitations.  The first is 
that we are not able to properly capture the effects of regulator-mandated price caps for 
distribution utilities during the transition period from regulation to competition.  Where rate caps 
have come off, the future path of electric prices is uncertain, due in large part to political 
pressures.  Where rate caps have not come off, they will not be lifted for several years.  A second 
limitation is that our data set only includes a sample of investor-owned utilities.  We are thus not 
able to capture any of the effects on municipal, cooperative, or government-owned utilities.  A 
third issue is that the FERC Form 1 data we use to estimate costs likely suffers from significant 
variations in accounting practices.  This does not affect the statistical properties of our 
estimators, but does make the error terms in our regressions larger than they otherwise would be.  
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Finally our data does not capture any of the technological changes taking place in the electric 
power industry, particularly with regard to distributed generation and microgrids. 
To summarize, we find that utilities that have undergone restructuring display significantly 
higher price-cost markups than utilities that remained traditionally regulated.  The combination 
of introducing retail competition into an electric utility’s operating territory and divestiture of 
that utility’s generating assets has increased costs, but has increased prices even more.  In 
particular, we find an average difference of 2 to 3 cents per kWh between prices and costs that is 
explained by restructuring rather than by increases in fuel prices.  We conclude that restructuring 
has been beneficial to companies that restructured, but the benefits have not reached consumers. 
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Appendix A : L ist of Companies 
Table A.1 contains a list of utility companies that were used in the data set for this study.  Some 
utilities in our sample operate in multiple states, but sufficient data was only available for one or 
some of those states.  The state(s) for which we had sufficient data are shown in the table.  Also 
shown for each utility is the percentage of data points missing from the EEI Average Rates and 
Typical Bills data set.  
Company Name State Missing Data (%) Company Name State Missing Data (%)
Alabama Power Company AL 3.0% Northern Indiana Public Service Company IN 33.3%
Appalachian Power Company TN 0.0% NorthWestern Corporation MT 0.0%
Arizona Public Service Company AZ 30.3% Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc. NY 3.0%
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company MD 0.0% Otter Tail Corporation MN 0.0%
Bangor Hydroelectric Company ME 18.2% Pacific Gas and Electric Company CA 3.0%
Central Illinois Light Company IL 15.2% PacifiCorp OR 0.0%
Central Vermont Public Service Corporation VT 6.1% PECO Energy Company PA 9.1%
Commonwealth Edison Company IL 0.0% Pennsylvania Electric Company PA 15.2%
Connecticut Light and Power Company CT 9.1% Portland General Electric Company OR 3.0%
Consumers Energy Company MI 0.0% Potomac Edison Company MD 3.0%
Dayton Power and Light OH 27.3% Potomac Electric Power Company DC 3.0%
Detroit Edison Company MI 0.0% Public Service Company of Colorado CO 9.1%
Edison Sault Electric Company MI 12.1% Public Service Company of New Hampshire NH 0.0%
El Paso Electric Company TX 12.1% Public Service Company of New Mexico NM 18.2%
Empire District Electric Company AR 0.0% Public Service Company of Oklahoma OK 0.0%
Entergy Arkansas AR 0.0% Public Service Electric and Gas Company NJ 15.2%
Entergy Louisiana LA 6.1% Puget Sound Energy WA 0.0%
Entergy Mississippi MS 36.4% Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation NY 3.0%
Entergy New Orleans LA 9.1% San Diego Gas and Electric Company CA 12.1%
Georgia Power Company GA 0.0% South Beloit Water, Gas, and Electric IL 15.2%
Green Mountain Power Corporation VT 12.1% South Carolina Electric and Gas Company SC 9.1%
Gulf Power Company FL 6.1% Southern California Edison Company CA 9.1%
Idaho Power Company ID 0.0% Southwestern Electric Service Company AR 21.2%
Illinois Power IL 27.3% Southwestern Public Service Company KS 6.1%
Indianapolis Power and Light Company IN 6.1% Superior Water, Power and Light Company WI 21.2%
Interstate Power and Light IL 21.2% Tampa Electric Company FL 0.0%
Kansas City Power and Light Company KS 0.0% Texas Utilities TX 24.2%
Kentucky Utilities Company KY 3.0% The United Illuminating Company CT 0.0%
Madison Gas and Electric Company WI 3.0% Tucson Electric Power Company AZ 6.1%
Metropolitan Edison Company PA 15.2% Unitil NH 3.0%
MidAmerican Energy Company IL 21.2% Upper Peninsula Power Company MI 0.0%
Mississippi Power Company MS 15.2% West Penn Power Company PA 3.0%
Monongahela Power Company OH 3.0% Western Massachusetts Electric Company MA 12.1%
Nevada Power Company NV 0.0% Wisconsin Public Service Corporation WI 0.0%
New York State Electric & Gas Corporation NY 21.2%  
 Table A.1. List of electric utilities considered in this study. 
Appendix B: Detailed Description of the E E I Data 
Data collection procedures and description of the EEI report dates 
EEI publishes the Typical Bill and Average Rate data twice yearly – the winter edition (which is 
published in April) reports on typical bills based on rates in effect January 1 and the summer 
edition (which is published in October) reports on typical bills based on rates in effect July 1.  
The Typical Bill data represents a snapshot of the rates in effect January 1 and July 1.  Thus, the 
Typical Bill data for Winter 1998 would represent rates in effect January 1, 1998, and the 
Typical Bill data for Summer 1998 would represent rates in effect July 1, 1998.  A time series of 
Typical Bill data would thus represent a series of snapshots through time. 
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Data for the Average Rate publication carries a different significance.  Each edition of the 
Average Rate data shows the average rates (calculated using total sales and total revenue as 
reported by each company) over the past year starting with the date targeted by the individual 
report.  Thus, the Average Rate data for Winter 1998 represents total sales and revenue (and 
average prices) during calendar year 1997.  The Average Rate data for Summer 1998 represents 
total sales and revenue (and average prices) for the first six months of 1998 and the last six 
months of 1997.  A time series of Average Rate data would thus represent a moving average of 
rates over time.  This distinguishes the Average Rate data from a similar data source put out by 
EIA. 
A difference between the EEI Average Rate data and the EIA data, particularly since 
restructuring, is: (a) recent EEI Average Rate data is unbundled, showing the generation, 
delivery, and (if applicable) CTC components, and (b), EIA data may contain a mix of default 
service utilities and competitive suppliers, whereas EEI Average Rate data only represents the 
investor-owned default service utilities.  The EEI data is thus consistent over time, whereas the 
universe of respondents to the EIA data survey has changed significantly with restructuring. 
Summer/Winter Differentials 
The EEI Typical Bill data for some editions contains columns RES_DIFF, COMM_DIFF, and 
IND_DIFF.  These are indicator variables for each company showing whether that company has 
a different rate structure in the summer and in the winter.  These columns do not appear in the 
data series for all editions of the Typical Bill data. 
Fuel Cost Adjustments 
The fuel cost adjustments (FCA) represent positive or negative differentials to every kilowatt-
hour used, and can vary over rate classes.  In the Typical Bill data published by EEI, there is an 
FCA reported for each company.  While these are disaggregated from the rest of the bill, the 
FCA is included in the Typical Bill data for each customer class.  That is, if the FCA for a given 
company was $1 and a certain bill was $14, the total bill is $14 and not $15 ($14 + $1 for the 
FCA).  The bill without the FCA would be $13. 
An FCA of zero for a specific company does not necessarily mean that the company does not 
have a fuel adjustment clause in place.  If the FCA for a given state or company is consistently 
zero for a large number of years, then it is likely that the given state or company does not include 
fuel cost adjustments in its rate settlements, but not 100% certain. 
Demand charges 
The data collected by EEI for the Typical Bill and Average Rate data series do not include a 
disaggregated demand charge, but the monetary effect of the demand charge does show up in the 
data.  In the Average Rate data, companies report total sales and total revenue, which includes 
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demand charges.  Thus, the average rates, in cents per kilowatt-hour, also have demand charges 
rolled in.  The dollar figures in the Typical Bill data also include total payments attributable to 
demand charges. 
 
Documentation of Average Rate and Typical Bill Data Sets 
This section describes the data taken from the EEI publications Average Rates and Typical Bills.  
It is a straightforward description of each data column included in the publication. 
 
1. Average Rates – contains information from the EEI Average Rates publication.  The 
publication comes out twice per year, with data on average rates by customer class (commercial, 
residential, and industrial).  The data at time t reflects a volume-weighted average price for the 
previous twelve months. 
 
Column Headings: 
Company Name – shows the name of the company 
State – shows the state associated with the company and price data (some companies operate in 
multiple states; these companies will have multiple entries, one for each state in which they 
operate). 
Date – shows the date of the report 
Data – shows the time frame covering the twelve-month averaging 
Rate Portion – shows whether the average price represents a bundled rate (including generation, 
transmission, delivery, and demand charges) or a specific portion of the bundled rate.  Prior to 
deregulation, utilities were vertically integrated and all price data is bundled.  Following 
deregulation, some companies have split their data submission into generation, transmission, 
delivery, and stranded-cost charges. 
Total – shows the average rate (cents per kWh) for all customers 
Residential – shows the average rate (cents per kWh) for the residential class 
Commercial – shows the average rate (cents per kWh) for the commercial class 
Industrial – shows the average rate (cents per kWh) for the industrial class 
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2. Typical Bills – contains information from the EEI Typical Bills publication.  The publication 
comes out twice per year, with data on total expenditures by utility and customer class.  The data 
at time t represents total expenditures by the average customer at that time – the typical bill data 
does not represent a moving average like the Average Rate data set. 
 
Column Headings: 
Date – shows the date of the report.  Winter reports are issued in January and Summer reports are 
issued in July. 
Rate Component – shows whether the average price represents a bundled rate (including 
generation, transmission, delivery, and demand charges) or a specific portion of the bundled rate.  
Prior to deregulation, utilities were vertically integrated and all price data is bundled.  Following 
deregulation, some companies have split their data submission into generation, transmission, 
delivery, and stranded-cost charges. 
State Code – a numerical code for each state. 
State – shows the state associated with the company and price data (some companies operate in 
multiple states; these companies will have multiple entries, one for each state in which they 
operate). 
Region – shows the region associated with the company and price data. 
Company Code – a numerical code for each company. 
Company – shows the name of the company. 
Residential FCA – shows the amount of the residential fuel price adjustment (in dollars) charged 
by the utility and allowed by the public utility commission.  The FCA is interpreted as a 
differential from the previous period’s data.  If the FCA is x at time t, that says that x amount of 
the difference between the total expenditures at time t and time t – 1 is attributable to fuel cost 
adjustments.  Any remaining difference is attributable to other factors. 
Residential Differential – shows whether the company is allowed to charge differentiated rates to 
residential customers in the summer and the winter.  The variable is binary – an entry of 1 
indicates that the utility is allowed to charge differentiated rates to residential customers and an 
entry of 0 indicates that the utility is not allowed to charge differential rates to residential 
customers. 
Commercial FCA – shows the amount of the commercial fuel price adjustment (in dollars) 
charged by the utility and allowed by the public utility commission.  The FCA is interpreted as a 
differential from the previous period’s data.  If the FCA is x at time t, that says that x amount of 
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the difference between the total commercial expenditures at time t and time t – 1 is attributable to 
fuel cost adjustments.  Any remaining difference is attributable to other factors. 
Commercial Differential – shows whether the company is allowed to charge differentiated rates 
to commercial customers in the summer and the winter.  The variable is binary – an entry of 1 
indicates that the utility is allowed to charge differentiated rates to commercial customers and an 
entry of 0 indicates that the utility is not allowed to charge differential rates to commercial 
customers. 
Industrial FCA – shows the amount of the industrial fuel price adjustment (in dollars) charged by 
the utility and allowed by the public utility commission.  The FCA is interpreted as a differential 
from the previous period’s data.  If the FCA is x at time t, that says that x amount of the 
difference between the total industrial expenditures at time t and time t – 1 is attributable to fuel 
cost adjustments.  Any remaining difference is attributable to other factors. 
Industrial Differential – shows whether the company is allowed to charge differentiated rates to 
industrial customers in the summer and the winter.  The variable is binary – an entry of 1 
indicates that the utility is allowed to charge differentiated rates to industrial customers and an 
entry of 0 indicates that the utility is not allowed to charge differential rates to industrial 
customers. 
 
The next selection of columns shows the total expenditures, in total dollars, for a typical or 
average customer in a wide variety of rate classes. 
 
Residential Z – shows total expenditures for a residential consumer using up to Z kWh per 
month. 
Residential Hot Water Heating Z – shows total expenditures for a residential consumer with 
electric hot water heating using up to Z kWh per month. 
Residential All Electric Z – shows total expenditures for a residential consumer with all electric 
appliances (heat, cooking, etc) using up to Z kWh per month. 
Commercial Y x Z – shows total expenditures for a commercial customer with a peak demand of 
up to Y kW and a total usage of up to Z kWh per month. 
Industrial Y x Z – shows total expenditures for an industrial customer with a peak demand of up 
to Y kW and a total usage of up to Z MWh per month. 
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We note that consumption for industrial customers is in MWh and consumption for commercial 
and residential customers is in kWh. 
 
Appendix C : Detailed Description of the F E R C Form 1 Data 
The FERC Form 1 is a combination operational statement and financial statement that every 
investor-owned utility (IOU) must submit to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) on a quarterly basis.  Merchant generators (companies that own generation but sell it 
only to the market and do not have any customers), federal utilities, and municipal utilities do not 
have to fill out the FERC Form 1.  In our study, we use annual (end-of-year) FERC Form 1 data, 
which contains cumulative data covering the entire calendar year.  In the course of gathering data 
for our study, we found that companies were inconsistent in whether and how they filed their 
quarterly FERC Form 1 reports.  Any company that did not file an end-of-year FERC Form 1 
during our sample period was excluded from our sample. 
The following describes the data extracted from the FERC Form 1 for the purposes of this study: 
Sales to Ultimate Consumers: The total amount of electric energy (MWh) sold to end-use 
customers of a given utility.  This figure does not include wholesale purchases, sales, or 
exchanges.  The source for this data is page 300, line item 10 of the FERC Form 1. 
Net Generation: Total electric energy (MWh) produced by a given utility, net of any electric 
energy required to operate generating facilities.  This output data is gathered from multiple 
sources within the FERC Form 1, where applicable.  Data for large steam generators is from 
page 402.  Data for large hydro generators is from page 406.  Data from pumped hydro 
generators is from page 408.  Data from small generators is from page 410. 
Sales for Resale: The total amount (MWh) and nominal dollar value of all electric energy sold on 
the wholesale market (including exchanges and bilateral deals).  The source for this data in dollar 
terms is page 300, line item 11 of the FERC Form 1.  The source for this data in quantity terms is 
page 301, line item 11. 
Purchased Power: The total amount (MWh) and nominal dollar value of all electric energy 
purchased from the wholesale market (including exchanges and bilateral deals).  The source for 
this data in dollar terms is page 321, line item 76 of the FERC Form 1.  The source for this data 
in quantity terms is page 327. 
Generation Cost:  Total reported expenditures, in nominal dollars, on the generation of electric 
energy.  The cost figures we use include operations and maintenance (including reported fuel 
purchases) but not depreciation.  The source for this data is page 320, line item 80 of the FERC 
Form 1. 
Transmission Cost: Total reported expenditures, in nominal dollars, on the bulk transmission 
assets of a given utility.  This figure includes annual investment, operations and maintenance 
costs.  It does not include expenditures related to congestion payments, wheeling charges, or 
other transmission expenditures incurred as a direct result of wholesale purchases.  The source 
for this data is page 320, line item 100 of the FERC Form 1. 
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Distribution Cost: Total reported expenditures, in nominal dollars, on the distribution assets of a 
given utility.  The source for this data is page 320, line item 126 of the FERC Form 1. 
Appendix D: A lternate Model Specifications 
In this Appendix, we show regression results for some alternate specifications of our model in 
Section 4.  
D .1 Percentage Price-Cost Markup 
The regression results shown in this paper use a “levels” definition of the price-cost markup – 
that is, the markup is defined as: 
Markupijt = Net Rateijt - Average Costi,t, 
where Net Rateijt indicates that the competitive transition charge (CTC), if applicable, has been 
subtracted from the utility’s rate reported in the Average Rates and Typical Bills publication.  An 
alternate definition of the price-cost markup would be one similar to the Lerner Index, but using 
average, rather than marginal, rates and costs: 
%Markupijt = (Net Rateijt - Average Costi,t) ÷ Net Rateijt. 
Tables D.1 through D.4 show the regression results using the percentage markup for each 
customer class as the dependent variable, rather than the level markup.  In general, the 
formulation based on the percentage markup was found to have little explanatory power, 
compared to the formulation discussed in the main body of this paper. 
Dependent variable: A ll C lasses Markup (Percentage)
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic
Constant 0.97 22.33
Time -0.09 -15.21
RTO Dummy 0.02 0.16
Retail Dummy 0.21 2.47
Divestiture Dummy 0.09 1.52
RTO*Retail -0.12 -0.84
RTO*Divestiture -0.02 -0.19
Ratio of Purchases to Generation 0.00 -3.13
Fuel Cost Adjustment 0.00 0.19
Regression Std. Error 0.233
Regression Adjusted R^2 0.27  
Table D .1. Regression results for all rate classes, with percentage markup as the dependent 
variable. 
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Dependent variable: Residential Markup (Percentage)
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic
Constant 1.40 24.15
Time -0.11 -13.91
RTO Dummy -0.05 -0.43
Retail Dummy 0.19 1.75
Divestiture Dummy 0.15 2.04
RTO*Retail -0.06 -0.40
RTO*Divestiture -0.10 -0.70
Ratio of Purchases to Generation 0.00 -1.63
Fuel Cost Adjustment -0.01 -0.48
Regression Std. Error 0.36
Regression Adjusted R^2 0.28  
Table D .2. Regression results for the residential rate class, with percentage markup as the 
dependent variable. 
 
 
Dependent variable: Commercial Markup (Percentage)
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic
Constant 0.84 19.85
Time -0.05 -8.46
RTO Dummy 0.05 0.38
Retail Dummy 0.15 1.60
Divestiture Dummy 0.13 2.42
RTO*Retail -0.11 -0.66
RTO*Divestiture -0.07 -0.47
Ratio of Purchases to Generation 0.00 -4.29
Fuel Cost Adjustment 0.00 0.28
Regression Std. Error 0.23
Regression Adjusted R^2 0.22  
Table D .3. Regression results for the commercial rate class, with percentage markup as the 
dependent variable. 
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Dependent variable: Industrial Markup (Percentage)
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic
Constant 1.24 21.57
Time -0.06 -7.71
RTO Dummy 0.03 0.22
Retail Dummy 0.09 0.74
Divestiture Dummy 0.18 2.50
RTO*Retail 0.00 -0.03
RTO*Divestiture -0.19 -1.13
Ratio of Purchases to Generation 0.00 -2.47
Fuel Cost Adjustment 0.00 0.18
Regression Std. Error 0.36
Regression Adjusted R^2 0.25  
Table D .4. Regression results for the industrial rate class, with percentage markup as the 
dependent variable. 
 
D .2. Inclusion of fuel-mix variables 
We also ran our regressions including some measures of the fuel mix of each utility.  We note 
that our price-cost markup variable already incorporates the utility-level reported fuel purchase 
costs (as in FERC Form 1).  Since the influence of fuel prices is already in our regressions, it is 
not clear what (if any) additional information is provided by the fuel mix variables.  The 
parameter estimates for the fuel mix are often statistically insignificant and difficult to interpret.  
We include regression results with these fuel mix variables for the sake of completeness.  Table 
D.5 includes regression results with the level of the price-cost markup as the dependent variable, 
while Table D.6 includes regression results with the percentage markup of price over cost as the 
dependent variable. 
Table D .5. Regression results including utility-level fuel mix variables, with the level of the 
price-cost markup as the dependent variable. 
Variable Coef . T-Stat. Coef . T-Stat. Coef . T-Stat. Coef . T-Stat.
Constant 5.33 11.78 6.39 13.38 5.66 11.89 3.45 7.70
Time -0.35 -11.18 -0.32 -9.27 -0.35 -9.98 -0.38 -11.96
RTO Dummy 1.34 1.60 2.29 2.87 1.62 1.78 -0.32 -0.39
Retail Dummy 3.18 3.78 3.74 4.92 3.31 4.05 2.39 2.56
RTO*Retail -2.25 -2.03 -2.48 -2.40 -2.62 -2.32 -1.27 -1.12
Divestiture Dummy 1.30 4.99 2.04 6.96 1.53 5.70 0.89 3.75
RTO*Divestiture -1.45 -1.45 -2.86 -2.90 -2.08 -2.05 -0.53 -0.57
Ratio of Purchases to Generation -2.18 -4.52 -2.42 -4.88 -2.33 -4.71 -1.86 -3.84
Coal Generation (%) -1.24 -3.29 -1.23 -3.04 -1.17 -2.97 -0.95 -2.48
Gas Generation (%) 0.28 0.67 0.13 0.30 0.49 1.10 0.26 0.66
Nuke Generation (%) 0.75 2.31 1.30 3.82 0.77 2.40 0.28 0.97
Hydro Generation (%) -0.74 -1.80 -0.70 -1.50 -0.55 -1.26 -0.88 -2.20
Oil Generation (%) -0.28 -0.66 -0.63 -1.28 -0.42 -0.90 -0.28 -0.68
Fuel Cost Adjustment -0.05 -0.41 -0.07 -0.60 -0.08 -0.72 -0.10 -0.76
R^2 0.41 0.39 0.4 0.35
Ave rage  Mark up Res idential Mark up Comme rcial Mark up Indust rial Mark up
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Table D .6. Regression results including utility-level fuel mix variables, with the percentage 
markup of price over cost as the dependent variable. 
 
Variable Coef . T-Stat. Coef . T-Stat. Coef . T-Stat. Coef . T-Stat.
Constant 1.17 5.54 1.56 6.22 1.31 6.40 0.62 4.02
Time -0.10 -5.77 -0.12 -5.72 -0.11 -6.03 -0.08 -5.75
RTO Dummy 0.71 1.66 0.81 1.70 0.71 1.67 0.47 1.45
Retail Dummy 1.02 1.46 1.26 1.59 1.03 1.49 0.66 1.26
RTO*Retail -0.51 -0.73 -0.57 -0.72 -0.53 -0.77 -0.29 -0.56
Divestiture Dummy -0.01 -0.05 0.10 0.66 0.04 0.27 -0.04 -0.40
RTO*Divestiture -0.86 -1.56 -1.13 -1.82 -0.94 -1.70 -0.62 -1.47
Ratio of Purchases to Generation -0.36 -2.27 -0.56 -3.07 -0.44 -2.83 -0.16 -1.36
Coal Generation (%) -0.21 -2.40 -0.23 -2.23 -0.20 -2.14 -0.16 -2.21
Gas Generation (%) -0.14 -0.95 -0.16 -0.89 -0.05 -0.33 -0.11 -0.95
Nuke Generation (%) 0.29 2.29 0.43 2.79 0.27 2.09 0.15 1.57
Hydro Generation (%) -0.35 -1.79 -0.36 -1.58 -0.31 -1.55 -0.32 -2.10
Oil Generation (%) 0.05 0.28 -0.04 -0.20 0.03 0.16 0.06 0.39
Fuel Cost Adjustment 0.12 1.12 0.12 1.05 0.09 0.99 0.09 1.05
R^2 0.26 0.28 0.26 0.26
Ave rage  Mark up Res idential Mark up Comme rcial Mark up Indust rial Mark up
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